Adversarial Graph Traversal
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866908827973058560 |
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| author | Banks, David Ceyhan, Elvan Johnson, Leah Zhou, Li |
| author_facet | Banks, David Ceyhan, Elvan Johnson, Leah Zhou, Li |
| contents | Suppose a Bayesian agent seeks to traverse a graph. Each time she crosses an edge, she pays a price. The first time she reaches a node, there is a payoff. She has an opponent who can reduce the payoffs. This paper uses adversarial risk analysis to find a solution to her route selection problem. It shows how the traveler is advantaged by having an accurate subjective distribution over the costs/payoffs and by having a Bayesian prior for her opponent's strategic choices. The results are relevant to military convoy routing, corporate competition, and certain games. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_11048 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Adversarial Graph Traversal Banks, David Ceyhan, Elvan Johnson, Leah Zhou, Li Optimization and Control 90C40, 91A25, 62F15 Suppose a Bayesian agent seeks to traverse a graph. Each time she crosses an edge, she pays a price. The first time she reaches a node, there is a payoff. She has an opponent who can reduce the payoffs. This paper uses adversarial risk analysis to find a solution to her route selection problem. It shows how the traveler is advantaged by having an accurate subjective distribution over the costs/payoffs and by having a Bayesian prior for her opponent's strategic choices. The results are relevant to military convoy routing, corporate competition, and certain games. |
| title | Adversarial Graph Traversal |
| topic | Optimization and Control 90C40, 91A25, 62F15 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.11048 |