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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.11048 |
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Table of Contents:
- Suppose a Bayesian agent seeks to traverse a graph. Each time she crosses an edge, she pays a price. The first time she reaches a node, there is a payoff. She has an opponent who can reduce the payoffs. This paper uses adversarial risk analysis to find a solution to her route selection problem. It shows how the traveler is advantaged by having an accurate subjective distribution over the costs/payoffs and by having a Bayesian prior for her opponent's strategic choices. The results are relevant to military convoy routing, corporate competition, and certain games.