Hardening the OSv Unikernel with Efficient Address Randomization: Design and Performance Evaluation

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Wollman, Alex, Hastings, John
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Wollman, Alex
Hastings, John
author_facet Wollman, Alex
Hastings, John
contents Unikernels are single-purpose library operating systems that run the kernel and application in one address space, but often omit security mitigations such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). In OSv, boot, program loading, and thread creation select largely deterministic addresses, leading to near-identical layouts across instances and more repeatable exploitation. To reduce layout predictability, this research introduces ASLR-style diversity into OSv by randomizing the application base and thread stack regions through targeted changes to core memory-management and loading routines. The implementation adds minimal complexity while preserving OSv's lightweight design goals. Evaluation against an unmodified baseline finds comparable boot time, application runtime, and memory usage. Analysis indicates that the generated addresses exhibit a uniform distribution. These results show that layout-randomization defenses can be efficiently and effectively integrated into OSv unikernels, improving resistance to reliable exploitation.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_11445
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Hardening the OSv Unikernel with Efficient Address Randomization: Design and Performance Evaluation
Wollman, Alex
Hastings, John
Cryptography and Security
Operating Systems
D.4.6; D.4.7; D.4.8
Unikernels are single-purpose library operating systems that run the kernel and application in one address space, but often omit security mitigations such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). In OSv, boot, program loading, and thread creation select largely deterministic addresses, leading to near-identical layouts across instances and more repeatable exploitation. To reduce layout predictability, this research introduces ASLR-style diversity into OSv by randomizing the application base and thread stack regions through targeted changes to core memory-management and loading routines. The implementation adds minimal complexity while preserving OSv's lightweight design goals. Evaluation against an unmodified baseline finds comparable boot time, application runtime, and memory usage. Analysis indicates that the generated addresses exhibit a uniform distribution. These results show that layout-randomization defenses can be efficiently and effectively integrated into OSv unikernels, improving resistance to reliable exploitation.
title Hardening the OSv Unikernel with Efficient Address Randomization: Design and Performance Evaluation
topic Cryptography and Security
Operating Systems
D.4.6; D.4.7; D.4.8
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.11445