PAC to the Future: Zero-Knowledge Proofs of PAC Private Systems
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866911443075465216 |
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| author | Repetto, Guilhem Sheybani, Nojan De Micheli, Gabrielle Koushanfar, Farinaz |
| author_facet | Repetto, Guilhem Sheybani, Nojan De Micheli, Gabrielle Koushanfar, Farinaz |
| contents | Privacy concerns in machine learning systems have grown significantly with the increasing reliance on sensitive user data for training large-scale models. This paper introduces a novel framework combining Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) Privacy with zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to provide verifiable privacy guarantees in trustless computing environments. Our approach addresses the limitations of traditional privacy-preserving techniques by enabling users to verify both the correctness of computations and the proper application of privacy-preserving noise, particularly in cloud-based systems. We leverage non-interactive ZKP schemes to generate proofs that attest to the correct implementation of PAC privacy mechanisms while maintaining the confidentiality of proprietary systems. Our results demonstrate the feasibility of achieving verifiable PAC privacy in outsourced computation, offering a practical solution for maintaining trust in privacy-preserving machine learning and database systems while ensuring computational integrity. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_11954 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | PAC to the Future: Zero-Knowledge Proofs of PAC Private Systems Repetto, Guilhem Sheybani, Nojan De Micheli, Gabrielle Koushanfar, Farinaz Cryptography and Security Privacy concerns in machine learning systems have grown significantly with the increasing reliance on sensitive user data for training large-scale models. This paper introduces a novel framework combining Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) Privacy with zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to provide verifiable privacy guarantees in trustless computing environments. Our approach addresses the limitations of traditional privacy-preserving techniques by enabling users to verify both the correctness of computations and the proper application of privacy-preserving noise, particularly in cloud-based systems. We leverage non-interactive ZKP schemes to generate proofs that attest to the correct implementation of PAC privacy mechanisms while maintaining the confidentiality of proprietary systems. Our results demonstrate the feasibility of achieving verifiable PAC privacy in outsourced computation, offering a practical solution for maintaining trust in privacy-preserving machine learning and database systems while ensuring computational integrity. |
| title | PAC to the Future: Zero-Knowledge Proofs of PAC Private Systems |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.11954 |