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Strengthening Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Multi-Unit Auctions

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Babaioff, Moshe, Feng, Yiding, Luo, Zihan
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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