Choose Your Agent: Tradeoffs in Adopting AI Advisors, Coaches, and Delegates in Multi-Party Negotiation
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866914328291049472 |
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| author | Zhu, Kehang Thain, Nithum Tsai, Vivian Wexler, James Qian, Crystal |
| author_facet | Zhu, Kehang Thain, Nithum Tsai, Vivian Wexler, James Qian, Crystal |
| contents | As AI usage becomes more prevalent in social contexts, understanding agent-user interaction is critical to designing systems that improve both individual and group outcomes. We present an online behavioral experiment (N = 243) in which participants play three multi-turn bargaining games in groups of three. Each game, presented in randomized order, grants access to a single LLM assistance modality: proactive recommendations from an Advisor, reactive feedback from a Coach, or autonomous execution by a Delegate; all modalities are powered by an underlying LLM that achieves superhuman performance in an all-agent environment. On each turn, participants privately decide whether to act manually or use the AI modality available in that game. Despite preferring the Advisor modality, participants achieve the highest mean individual gains with the Delegate, demonstrating a preference-performance misalignment. Moreover, delegation generates positive externalities; even non-adopting users in access-to-delegate treatment groups benefit by receiving higher-quality offers. Mechanism analysis reveals that the Delegate agent acts as a market maker, injecting rational, Pareto-improving proposals that restructure the trading environment. Our research reveals a gap between agent capabilities and realized group welfare. While autonomous agents can exhibit super-human strategic performance, their impact on realized welfare gains can be constrained by interfaces, user perceptions, and adoption barriers. Assistance modalities should be designed as mechanisms with endogenous participation; adoption-compatible interaction rules are a prerequisite to improving human welfare with automated assistance. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_12089 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Choose Your Agent: Tradeoffs in Adopting AI Advisors, Coaches, and Delegates in Multi-Party Negotiation Zhu, Kehang Thain, Nithum Tsai, Vivian Wexler, James Qian, Crystal Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Human-Computer Interaction As AI usage becomes more prevalent in social contexts, understanding agent-user interaction is critical to designing systems that improve both individual and group outcomes. We present an online behavioral experiment (N = 243) in which participants play three multi-turn bargaining games in groups of three. Each game, presented in randomized order, grants access to a single LLM assistance modality: proactive recommendations from an Advisor, reactive feedback from a Coach, or autonomous execution by a Delegate; all modalities are powered by an underlying LLM that achieves superhuman performance in an all-agent environment. On each turn, participants privately decide whether to act manually or use the AI modality available in that game. Despite preferring the Advisor modality, participants achieve the highest mean individual gains with the Delegate, demonstrating a preference-performance misalignment. Moreover, delegation generates positive externalities; even non-adopting users in access-to-delegate treatment groups benefit by receiving higher-quality offers. Mechanism analysis reveals that the Delegate agent acts as a market maker, injecting rational, Pareto-improving proposals that restructure the trading environment. Our research reveals a gap between agent capabilities and realized group welfare. While autonomous agents can exhibit super-human strategic performance, their impact on realized welfare gains can be constrained by interfaces, user perceptions, and adoption barriers. Assistance modalities should be designed as mechanisms with endogenous participation; adoption-compatible interaction rules are a prerequisite to improving human welfare with automated assistance. |
| title | Choose Your Agent: Tradeoffs in Adopting AI Advisors, Coaches, and Delegates in Multi-Party Negotiation |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Human-Computer Interaction |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.12089 |