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Main Authors:	Bredereck, Robert, Sun, Bin, Briman, Eyal, Talmon, Nimrod
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.12231
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