Network Interventions: Targeting Agents or Targeting Links?
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866915796874166272 |
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| author | Dasaratha, Krishna Shah, Anant |
| author_facet | Dasaratha, Krishna Shah, Anant |
| contents | Consider a network game with linear best responses and spillovers between players, and let agents endogenously choose their links. A planner considers interventions to subsidize actions and/or links between players, aiming to maximize a welfare function depending on equilibrium actions. The structure of the optimal intervention depends on whether links provide non-negative intrinsic value to agents. When they do, it is optimal to focus only on subsidizing actions. When the intrinsic value of links is negative, we give conditions for including link subsidies to be optimal. This reverses the basic structure of the optimal intervention in settings with exogenous links. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_12897 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Network Interventions: Targeting Agents or Targeting Links? Dasaratha, Krishna Shah, Anant Theoretical Economics Consider a network game with linear best responses and spillovers between players, and let agents endogenously choose their links. A planner considers interventions to subsidize actions and/or links between players, aiming to maximize a welfare function depending on equilibrium actions. The structure of the optimal intervention depends on whether links provide non-negative intrinsic value to agents. When they do, it is optimal to focus only on subsidizing actions. When the intrinsic value of links is negative, we give conditions for including link subsidies to be optimal. This reverses the basic structure of the optimal intervention in settings with exogenous links. |
| title | Network Interventions: Targeting Agents or Targeting Links? |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.12897 |