Multi-type random game dynamics: limits at discontinuities and cyclic limits

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Vyas, Raghupati, Das, Kousik, Kavitha, Veeraruna, Roy, Souvik
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Vyas, Raghupati
Das, Kousik
Kavitha, Veeraruna
Roy, Souvik
author_facet Vyas, Raghupati
Das, Kousik
Kavitha, Veeraruna
Roy, Souvik
contents We consider (random) strategic interactions in a large population consisting of a variety of players. A rational player chooses actions that maximise certain utility functions, while a behavioural player chooses actions based on preferences such as avoid-the-crowd or follow-the-majority. We specifically study a turn-by-turn dynamic process in which players choose their actions sequentially and once; the utilities are realised either immediately or at the end of the game. In the literature, such dynamical systems are often analysed using an appropriate approximating ordinary differential equation (ODE). However, the ODEs approximating the dynamics with pure actions are typically discontinuous. We adopt a differential inclusion (DI) based stochastic-approximation framework to derive the limiting analysis. The limits of the dynamics are characterised through the internally chain transitive (ICT) sets. We identify the presence of non-classical zeros as potential limits of the dynamics, a phenomenon not observed in classical settings involving continuous ODEs. These new limits arise precisely at the points of discontinuity of the dynamics. We further provide the conditions under which cyclic outcomes may occur at the limit. Finally, we study a queuing game with differential priority-based services and examine the impact of the proportions of avoid-the-crowd and two types of rational populations on the long-run outcomes of the strategic interactions. We identify potential point limits and establish the possibility of cyclic outcomes for certain parameter configurations.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_13032
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Multi-type random game dynamics: limits at discontinuities and cyclic limits
Vyas, Raghupati
Das, Kousik
Kavitha, Veeraruna
Roy, Souvik
Optimization and Control
We consider (random) strategic interactions in a large population consisting of a variety of players. A rational player chooses actions that maximise certain utility functions, while a behavioural player chooses actions based on preferences such as avoid-the-crowd or follow-the-majority. We specifically study a turn-by-turn dynamic process in which players choose their actions sequentially and once; the utilities are realised either immediately or at the end of the game. In the literature, such dynamical systems are often analysed using an appropriate approximating ordinary differential equation (ODE). However, the ODEs approximating the dynamics with pure actions are typically discontinuous. We adopt a differential inclusion (DI) based stochastic-approximation framework to derive the limiting analysis. The limits of the dynamics are characterised through the internally chain transitive (ICT) sets. We identify the presence of non-classical zeros as potential limits of the dynamics, a phenomenon not observed in classical settings involving continuous ODEs. These new limits arise precisely at the points of discontinuity of the dynamics. We further provide the conditions under which cyclic outcomes may occur at the limit. Finally, we study a queuing game with differential priority-based services and examine the impact of the proportions of avoid-the-crowd and two types of rational populations on the long-run outcomes of the strategic interactions. We identify potential point limits and establish the possibility of cyclic outcomes for certain parameter configurations.
title Multi-type random game dynamics: limits at discontinuities and cyclic limits
topic Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.13032