Evolutionarily Primitive Social Entities
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866914332845015040 |
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| author | Kaufmann, Angelica |
| author_facet | Kaufmann, Angelica |
| contents | Social entities only exist in virtue of collective acceptance or recognition, or acknowledgement by two or more individuals in the context of joint activities. Joint activities are made possible by the coordination of plans for action, and the coordination of plans for action is made possible by the capacity for collective intentionality. This paper investigates how primitive is the capacity that nonhuman animals have to create social entities, by individuating how primitive is the capacity for collective intentionality. I present a novel argument for the evolutionary primitiveness of social entities, by showing that the collective intentions upon which these social entities are created and shared are metaphysically reducible to the relevant individual intentions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_14843 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Evolutionarily Primitive Social Entities Kaufmann, Angelica Neurons and Cognition Social entities only exist in virtue of collective acceptance or recognition, or acknowledgement by two or more individuals in the context of joint activities. Joint activities are made possible by the coordination of plans for action, and the coordination of plans for action is made possible by the capacity for collective intentionality. This paper investigates how primitive is the capacity that nonhuman animals have to create social entities, by individuating how primitive is the capacity for collective intentionality. I present a novel argument for the evolutionary primitiveness of social entities, by showing that the collective intentions upon which these social entities are created and shared are metaphysically reducible to the relevant individual intentions. |
| title | Evolutionarily Primitive Social Entities |
| topic | Neurons and Cognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.14843 |