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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.15333 |
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| _version_ | 1866913157649268736 |
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| author | Im, Jaehan |
| author_facet | Im, Jaehan |
| contents | Decentralized air traffic management requires coordination among self-interested stakeholders operating under shared safety and capacity constraints, where conventional centralized or implicitly cooperative models do not adequately capture this setting. We develop a unified perspective on noncooperative coordination, in which system-level outcomes emerge by designing incentives and assigning signals that reshape individual optimality rather than imposing cooperation or enforcement. We advance this framework along three directions: scalable equilibrium engineering via reduced-rank and uncertainty-aware correlated equilibria, decentralized mechanism design for equilibrium selection without enforcement, and structured noncooperative dynamics with convergence guarantees. Beyond these technical contributions, we discuss core design principles that govern incentive-compatible coordination in decentralized systems. Together, these results establish a foundation for scalable, robust coordination in safety-critical air traffic systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_15333 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Noncooperative Coordination for Decentralized Air Traffic Management Im, Jaehan Systems and Control Decentralized air traffic management requires coordination among self-interested stakeholders operating under shared safety and capacity constraints, where conventional centralized or implicitly cooperative models do not adequately capture this setting. We develop a unified perspective on noncooperative coordination, in which system-level outcomes emerge by designing incentives and assigning signals that reshape individual optimality rather than imposing cooperation or enforcement. We advance this framework along three directions: scalable equilibrium engineering via reduced-rank and uncertainty-aware correlated equilibria, decentralized mechanism design for equilibrium selection without enforcement, and structured noncooperative dynamics with convergence guarantees. Beyond these technical contributions, we discuss core design principles that govern incentive-compatible coordination in decentralized systems. Together, these results establish a foundation for scalable, robust coordination in safety-critical air traffic systems. |
| title | Noncooperative Coordination for Decentralized Air Traffic Management |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.15333 |