How to Disclose? Strategic AI Disclosure in Crowdfunding
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866915802519699456 |
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| author | Wang, Ning Liang, Chen |
| author_facet | Wang, Ning Liang, Chen |
| contents | As artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly integrates into crowdfunding practices, strategic disclosure of AI involvement has become critical. Yet, empirical insights into how different disclosure strategies influence investor decisions remain limited. Drawing on signaling theory and Aristotle's rhetorical framework, we examine how mandatory AI disclosure affects crowdfunding performance and how substantive signals (degree of AI involvement) and rhetorical signals (logos/explicitness, ethos/authenticity, pathos/emotional tone) moderate these effects. Leveraging Kickstarter's mandatory AI disclosure policy as a natural experiment and four supplementary online experiments, we find that mandatory AI disclosure significantly reduces crowdfunding performance: funds raised decline by 39.8% and backer counts by 23.9% for AI-involved projects. However, this adverse effect is systematically moderated by disclosure strategy. Greater AI involvement amplifies the negative effects of AI disclosure, while high authenticity and high explicitness mitigate them. Interestingly, excessive positive emotional tone (a strategy creators might intuitively adopt to counteract AI skepticism) backfires and exacerbates negative outcomes. Supplementary randomized experiments identify two underlying mechanisms: perceived creator competence and AI washing concerns. Substantive signals primarily affect competence judgments, whereas rhetorical signals operate through varied pathways: either mediator alone or both in sequence. These findings provide theoretical and practical insights for entrepreneurs, platforms, and policymakers strategically managing AI transparency in high-stakes investment contexts. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_15698 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | How to Disclose? Strategic AI Disclosure in Crowdfunding Wang, Ning Liang, Chen Human-Computer Interaction Artificial Intelligence As artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly integrates into crowdfunding practices, strategic disclosure of AI involvement has become critical. Yet, empirical insights into how different disclosure strategies influence investor decisions remain limited. Drawing on signaling theory and Aristotle's rhetorical framework, we examine how mandatory AI disclosure affects crowdfunding performance and how substantive signals (degree of AI involvement) and rhetorical signals (logos/explicitness, ethos/authenticity, pathos/emotional tone) moderate these effects. Leveraging Kickstarter's mandatory AI disclosure policy as a natural experiment and four supplementary online experiments, we find that mandatory AI disclosure significantly reduces crowdfunding performance: funds raised decline by 39.8% and backer counts by 23.9% for AI-involved projects. However, this adverse effect is systematically moderated by disclosure strategy. Greater AI involvement amplifies the negative effects of AI disclosure, while high authenticity and high explicitness mitigate them. Interestingly, excessive positive emotional tone (a strategy creators might intuitively adopt to counteract AI skepticism) backfires and exacerbates negative outcomes. Supplementary randomized experiments identify two underlying mechanisms: perceived creator competence and AI washing concerns. Substantive signals primarily affect competence judgments, whereas rhetorical signals operate through varied pathways: either mediator alone or both in sequence. These findings provide theoretical and practical insights for entrepreneurs, platforms, and policymakers strategically managing AI transparency in high-stakes investment contexts. |
| title | How to Disclose? Strategic AI Disclosure in Crowdfunding |
| topic | Human-Computer Interaction Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.15698 |