Cover Image

Equity in auction design with unit-demand agents and non-quasilinear preferences

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Kazumura, Tomoya, Mishra, Debasis, Serizawa, Shigehiro
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Robust procurement design
by: Mishra, Debasis, et al.
Published: (2025)

Optimal linear-payment auction design with aftermarket collaboration
by: Wang, Dazhong, et al.
Published: (2026)

Strategy-proof and Efficient Job Matching with Participation Constraints
by: Bikhchandani, Sushil, et al.
Published: (2026)

Undominated monopoly regulation
by: Mishra, Debasis, et al.
Published: (2024)

Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent
by: Mishra, Debasis, et al.
Published: (2022)

Pre-auction strategic communication
by: Yan, Eric
Published: (2026)

Robust double auction mechanisms
by: Yoon, Kiho
Published: (2021)

Uniform price auction with quantity constraints
by: Yoon, Kiho
Published: (2024)

Teacher transfers: equalizing deficits across schools
by: Mishra, Debasis, et al.
Published: (2025)

Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
by: Bikhchandani, Sushil, et al.
Published: (2022)

Walraswap: a solution to uniform price batch auctions
by: Yuhjtman, Sergio A.
Published: (2023)

Revealed preference and revealed preference cycles: a survey
by: Dziewulski, Paweł, et al.
Published: (2024)

Equity in strategic exchange
by: Liu, Peng, et al.
Published: (2025)

The geometry of consumer preference aggregation
by: Sandomirskiy, Fedor, et al.
Published: (2024)

A dynamic auction for multilateral collaboration
by: Huang, Chao
Published: (2024)

Efficient allocation with ordinal preference intensities
by: Gerasimou, Georgios
Published: (2020)

Partially rational preferences under ambiguity
by: Nakamura, Kensei, et al.
Published: (2025)

The probability of satisfying axioms: a non-binary perspective on economic design
by: Bardier, Pierre
Published: (2025)

Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice
by: Curello, Gregorio, et al.
Published: (2019)

Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
by: Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge, et al.
Published: (2023)

Efficient and fair trading mechanisms on the full preference domain
by: Yu, Jingsheng, et al.
Published: (2020)

Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences
by: Arribillaga, R. Pablo, et al.
Published: (2025)

A simple proof of the representation theorem for betweenness preferences
by: Akita, Yutaro
Published: (2024)

When is it (im)possible to respect all individuals' preferences under uncertainty?
by: Nakamura, Kensei
Published: (2025)

Social preferences or moral concerns: What drives rejections in the Ultimatum game?
by: Juan-Bartroli, Pau, et al.
Published: (2025)

Pareto-undominated strategy-proof rules in economies with multidimensional single-peaked preferences
by: Bonifacio, Agustin G.
Published: (2025)

Anonymity and strategy-proofness on a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
by: Gallo, Oihane
Published: (2024)

Information-Credible Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information
by: Mishra, Kaibalyapati
Published: (2025)

An efficiency ordering of k-price auctions under complete information
by: Goel, Sumit, et al.
Published: (2025)

Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
by: Cantillon, Estelle, et al.
Published: (2022)

Hoping for the best while preparing for the worst in the face of uncertainty: a new type of incomplete preferences
by: Bardier, Pierre, et al.
Published: (2024)

Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences
by: Chen, Haoning, et al.
Published: (2020)

Trade among moral agents with information asymmetries
by: Rivero-Wildemauwe, José Ignacio
Published: (2025)

Algorithmic collusion under competitive design
by: Conjeaud, Ivan
Published: (2023)

Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction
by: Yoon, Kiho
Published: (2021)

A core-selecting auction for portfolio's packages
by: Zarpala, Lamprirni, et al.
Published: (2022)

Efficient and fair trading mechanisms for resource exchange in market design
by: Yu, Jingsheng, et al.
Published: (2020)

Interactions across multiple games: cooperation, corruption, and organizational design
by: Bendor, Jonathan, et al.
Published: (2025)

Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture when agents have needs
by: Arribillaga, R. Pablo, et al.
Published: (2026)

Discussion about the assumptions of Category Theory approach to agent-based modeling in microeconomics
by: Jalas, Panu
Published: (2025)