Bloc Voting on Single Peaked Preferences
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| Soggetti: | |
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| _version_ | 1866911456532889600 |
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| author | Calver, Ariel Pallan, Serena Alice Park Wilson, Jennifer |
| author_facet | Calver, Ariel Pallan, Serena Alice Park Wilson, Jennifer |
| contents | We analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are adjacent. We also analyze the results of pairwise contests between winning and losing candidates and assess when the winning coalitions satisfy several proposed extensions of the Condorcet criterion to multiwinner voting methods. Finally, we use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate how frequently these coalitions arise under different assumptions about voter behavior. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_16734 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Bloc Voting on Single Peaked Preferences Calver, Ariel Pallan, Serena Alice Park Wilson, Jennifer Computer Science and Game Theory 91B12, 91B14 We analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are adjacent. We also analyze the results of pairwise contests between winning and losing candidates and assess when the winning coalitions satisfy several proposed extensions of the Condorcet criterion to multiwinner voting methods. Finally, we use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate how frequently these coalitions arise under different assumptions about voter behavior. |
| title | Bloc Voting on Single Peaked Preferences |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory 91B12, 91B14 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.16734 |