Prophet Inequality with Conservative Prediction

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Brüstle, Johannes, Cohen, Ilan Reuven, Leonardi, Stefano
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Brüstle, Johannes
Cohen, Ilan Reuven
Leonardi, Stefano
author_facet Brüstle, Johannes
Cohen, Ilan Reuven
Leonardi, Stefano
contents Prophet inequalities compare online stopping strategies against an omniscient "prophet" using distributional knowledge. In this work, we augment this model with a conservative prediction of the maximum realized value. We quantify the quality of this prediction using a parameter $α\in [0,1]$, ranging from inaccurate to perfect. Our goal is to improve performance when predictions are accurate (consistency) while maintaining theoretical guarantees when they are not (robustness). We propose a threshold-based strategy oblivious to $α$ (i.e., with $α$ unknown to the algorithm) that matches the classic competitive ratio of $1/2$ at $α=0$ and improves smoothly to $3/4$ at $α=1$. We further prove that simultaneously achieving better than $3/4$ at $α=1$ while maintaining $1/2$ at $α=0$ is impossible. Finally, when $α$ is known in advance, we present a strategy achieving a tight competitive ratio of $\frac{1}{2-α}$.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_17358
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Prophet Inequality with Conservative Prediction
Brüstle, Johannes
Cohen, Ilan Reuven
Leonardi, Stefano
Computer Science and Game Theory
68W27, 62L15, 60G40
Prophet inequalities compare online stopping strategies against an omniscient "prophet" using distributional knowledge. In this work, we augment this model with a conservative prediction of the maximum realized value. We quantify the quality of this prediction using a parameter $α\in [0,1]$, ranging from inaccurate to perfect. Our goal is to improve performance when predictions are accurate (consistency) while maintaining theoretical guarantees when they are not (robustness). We propose a threshold-based strategy oblivious to $α$ (i.e., with $α$ unknown to the algorithm) that matches the classic competitive ratio of $1/2$ at $α=0$ and improves smoothly to $3/4$ at $α=1$. We further prove that simultaneously achieving better than $3/4$ at $α=1$ while maintaining $1/2$ at $α=0$ is impossible. Finally, when $α$ is known in advance, we present a strategy achieving a tight competitive ratio of $\frac{1}{2-α}$.
title Prophet Inequality with Conservative Prediction
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
68W27, 62L15, 60G40
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.17358