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Robust Temporal Guarantees in Budgeted Sequential Auctions

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Fikioris, Giannis, Kleinberg, Robert, Kolumbus, Yoav, Mansour, Yishay, Tardos, Eva
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2026
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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