Drawing the LINE: Cryptographic Analysis and Security Improvements for the LINE E2EE Protocol

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Dowling, Benjamin, Gope, Prosanta, Nisa, Mehr U, Wimalasiri, Bhagya
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Dowling, Benjamin
Gope, Prosanta
Nisa, Mehr U
Wimalasiri, Bhagya
author_facet Dowling, Benjamin
Gope, Prosanta
Nisa, Mehr U
Wimalasiri, Bhagya
contents LINE has emerged as one of the most popular communication platforms in many East Asian countries, including Thailand and Japan, with millions of active users. Therefore, it is essential to understand its security guarantees. In this work, we present the first provable security analysis of the LINE version two (LINEv2) messaging protocol, focusing on its cryptographic guarantees in a real-world setting. We capture the architecture and security of the LINE messaging protocol by modifying the Multi-Stage Key Exchange (MSKE) model, a framework for analysing cryptographic protocols under adversarial conditions. While LINEv2 achieves basic security properties such as key indistinguishability and message authentication, we highlight the lack of forward secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS). To address this, we introduce a stronger version of the LINE protocol, introducing FS and PCS to LINE, analysing and benchmarking our results.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_18370
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Drawing the LINE: Cryptographic Analysis and Security Improvements for the LINE E2EE Protocol
Dowling, Benjamin
Gope, Prosanta
Nisa, Mehr U
Wimalasiri, Bhagya
Cryptography and Security
LINE has emerged as one of the most popular communication platforms in many East Asian countries, including Thailand and Japan, with millions of active users. Therefore, it is essential to understand its security guarantees. In this work, we present the first provable security analysis of the LINE version two (LINEv2) messaging protocol, focusing on its cryptographic guarantees in a real-world setting. We capture the architecture and security of the LINE messaging protocol by modifying the Multi-Stage Key Exchange (MSKE) model, a framework for analysing cryptographic protocols under adversarial conditions. While LINEv2 achieves basic security properties such as key indistinguishability and message authentication, we highlight the lack of forward secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS). To address this, we introduce a stronger version of the LINE protocol, introducing FS and PCS to LINE, analysing and benchmarking our results.
title Drawing the LINE: Cryptographic Analysis and Security Improvements for the LINE E2EE Protocol
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.18370