Matching with Committee Preferences
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866917311448875008 |
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| author | Song, Haoyu Nguyen, Thanh Lin, Young-san |
| author_facet | Song, Haoyu Nguyen, Thanh Lin, Young-san |
| contents | We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the school's internal ranking process. In particular, we define acceptable choices as candidates ranked above a top percentile of the accepted cohort by a sufficient number of evaluators. Stability is then defined in terms of acceptability: accepted candidates must receive strong support, while rejected candidates receive at most weak support. Since exact acceptability and stability may not exist, we construct approximately stable outcomes using a new equilibrium concept that combines matching with a Lindahl equilibrium over ordinal preferences, providing a flexible, equilibrium-based framework for committee-based matching markets. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_19009 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Matching with Committee Preferences Song, Haoyu Nguyen, Thanh Lin, Young-san Computer Science and Game Theory We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the school's internal ranking process. In particular, we define acceptable choices as candidates ranked above a top percentile of the accepted cohort by a sufficient number of evaluators. Stability is then defined in terms of acceptability: accepted candidates must receive strong support, while rejected candidates receive at most weak support. Since exact acceptability and stability may not exist, we construct approximately stable outcomes using a new equilibrium concept that combines matching with a Lindahl equilibrium over ordinal preferences, providing a flexible, equilibrium-based framework for committee-based matching markets. |
| title | Matching with Committee Preferences |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.19009 |