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Mechanism Design via Market Clearing-Prices for Value Maximizers under Budget and RoS Constraints

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Liu, Xiaodong, Shen, Weiran, Wang, Zihe
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2026
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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