Strategic Gaussian Signaling under Linear Sensitivity Mismatch
Fuente:
arXiv
Enregistré dans:
| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
|
| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | |
| Tags: |
Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
| _version_ | 1866911685126651904 |
|---|---|
| author | Munif, Hassan Varma, Vineeth Satheeskumar Lasaulce, Samson |
| author_facet | Munif, Hassan Varma, Vineeth Satheeskumar Lasaulce, Samson |
| contents | We analyze Stackelberg Gaussian signaling games where the encoder and decoder have a linear sensitivity mismatch. Unlike the standard additive-bias model, a sensitivity mismatch means the encoder prefers the decoder to track a linear transformation of the state rather than a shifted one. We derive the equilibrium structure for both noiseless (cheap-talk) and noisy signaling channels. In the noiseless case, the equilibrium admits a spectral characterization: the encoder transmits information only along eigenspaces associated with the negative eigenvalues of a mismatch matrix. In the noisy regime, we derive analytical thresholds for informative signaling, showing that communication collapses if the sensitivity mismatch or transmission cost exceeds a channel-dependent threshold. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_19292 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Gaussian Signaling under Linear Sensitivity Mismatch Munif, Hassan Varma, Vineeth Satheeskumar Lasaulce, Samson Computer Science and Game Theory Information Theory Systems and Control We analyze Stackelberg Gaussian signaling games where the encoder and decoder have a linear sensitivity mismatch. Unlike the standard additive-bias model, a sensitivity mismatch means the encoder prefers the decoder to track a linear transformation of the state rather than a shifted one. We derive the equilibrium structure for both noiseless (cheap-talk) and noisy signaling channels. In the noiseless case, the equilibrium admits a spectral characterization: the encoder transmits information only along eigenspaces associated with the negative eigenvalues of a mismatch matrix. In the noisy regime, we derive analytical thresholds for informative signaling, showing that communication collapses if the sensitivity mismatch or transmission cost exceeds a channel-dependent threshold. |
| title | Strategic Gaussian Signaling under Linear Sensitivity Mismatch |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Information Theory Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.19292 |