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Robust Mechanism Design with Anonymous Information

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Tang, Zhihao Gavin, Wang, Shixin
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2026
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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