Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866912922906656768 |
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| author | Hartline, Jason |
| author_facet | Hartline, Jason |
| contents | The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue
non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases
their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease.
Combinatorial auctions exhibit complementarities which broadly
result in complexities in auction theory. This brief note shows
that non-monotonicity in multi-item auctions is not a result of
complementarities, and in fact, VCG is revenue non-monotone even in matching
markets. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_20439 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets Hartline, Jason Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit complementarities which broadly result in complexities in auction theory. This brief note shows that non-monotonicity in multi-item auctions is not a result of complementarities, and in fact, VCG is revenue non-monotone even in matching markets. |
| title | Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20439 |