Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets

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1. Verfasser: Hartline, Jason
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Hartline, Jason
author_facet Hartline, Jason
contents The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit complementarities which broadly result in complexities in auction theory. This brief note shows that non-monotonicity in multi-item auctions is not a result of complementarities, and in fact, VCG is revenue non-monotone even in matching markets.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_20439
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets
Hartline, Jason
Theoretical Economics
Computer Science and Game Theory
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit complementarities which broadly result in complexities in auction theory. This brief note shows that non-monotonicity in multi-item auctions is not a result of complementarities, and in fact, VCG is revenue non-monotone even in matching markets.
title Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets
topic Theoretical Economics
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20439