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Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Hartline, Jason
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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