Post-Quantum Sanitizable Signatures from McEliece-Based Chameleon Hashing
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866915813313740800 |
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| author | Ahmad, Shahzad Rass, Stefan Seyedi, Zahra |
| author_facet | Ahmad, Shahzad Rass, Stefan Seyedi, Zahra |
| contents | We introduce a novel post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme constructed upon a chameleon hash function derived from the McEliece cryptosystem. In this design, the designated sanitizer possesses the inherent trapdoor of a Goppa code, which facilitates controlled collision-finding via Patterson decoding. This mechanism enables authorized modification of specific message blocks while ensuring all other content remains immutably bound. We provide formal security definitions and rigorous proofs of existential unforgeability and immutability, grounded in the hardness of syndrome decoding in the random-oracle model, where a robust random oracle thwarts trivial linear hash collisions. A key innovation lies in our precise characterization of the transparency property: by imposing a specific weight constraint on the randomizers generated by the signer, we achieve perfect transparency, rendering sanitized signatures indistinguishable from freshly signed ones. This work establishes the first transparent, code-based, post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme, offering strong theoretical guarantees and a pathway for practical deployment in long-term secure applications. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_20657 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Post-Quantum Sanitizable Signatures from McEliece-Based Chameleon Hashing Ahmad, Shahzad Rass, Stefan Seyedi, Zahra Cryptography and Security We introduce a novel post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme constructed upon a chameleon hash function derived from the McEliece cryptosystem. In this design, the designated sanitizer possesses the inherent trapdoor of a Goppa code, which facilitates controlled collision-finding via Patterson decoding. This mechanism enables authorized modification of specific message blocks while ensuring all other content remains immutably bound. We provide formal security definitions and rigorous proofs of existential unforgeability and immutability, grounded in the hardness of syndrome decoding in the random-oracle model, where a robust random oracle thwarts trivial linear hash collisions. A key innovation lies in our precise characterization of the transparency property: by imposing a specific weight constraint on the randomizers generated by the signer, we achieve perfect transparency, rendering sanitized signatures indistinguishable from freshly signed ones. This work establishes the first transparent, code-based, post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme, offering strong theoretical guarantees and a pathway for practical deployment in long-term secure applications. |
| title | Post-Quantum Sanitizable Signatures from McEliece-Based Chameleon Hashing |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20657 |