Decentralized Trading Networks: Equilibria and Fairness
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866910031524397056 |
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| author | Finster, Simon Goldberg, Paul W. Lock, Edwin Tullii, Matilde |
| author_facet | Finster, Simon Goldberg, Paul W. Lock, Edwin Tullii, Matilde |
| contents | We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined subset of Nash equilibria can be supported as competitive equilibria. Considering an offer-based trading dynamic as well as a stochastic price clock market, we prove new convergence results to Nash equilibrium and competitive equilibrium, providing a rationale for stability properties in decentralized, dynamic trading networks. Turning to the tension between fairness and (core) stability, we prove several negative results: inessential agents always receive zero utility in any core outcome, and even essential agents can get zero utility in all core outcomes. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_20868 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Decentralized Trading Networks: Equilibria and Fairness Finster, Simon Goldberg, Paul W. Lock, Edwin Tullii, Matilde Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined subset of Nash equilibria can be supported as competitive equilibria. Considering an offer-based trading dynamic as well as a stochastic price clock market, we prove new convergence results to Nash equilibrium and competitive equilibrium, providing a rationale for stability properties in decentralized, dynamic trading networks. Turning to the tension between fairness and (core) stability, we prove several negative results: inessential agents always receive zero utility in any core outcome, and even essential agents can get zero utility in all core outcomes. |
| title | Decentralized Trading Networks: Equilibria and Fairness |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20868 |