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Efficient Uncoupled Learning Dynamics with $\tilde{O}\!\left(T^{-1/4}\right)$ Last-Iterate Convergence in Bilinear Saddle-Point Problems over Convex Sets under Bandit Feedback

Fuente: arXiv

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali:	Maiti, Arnab, Zhang, Claire Jie, Jamieson, Kevin, Morgenstern, Jamie Heather, Panageas, Ioannis, Ratliff, Lillian J.
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2026
Soggetti:	Machine Learning Computer Science and Game Theory
Accesso online:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Aggiungi Tag Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!

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