Generalized Multidimensional Contests with Asymmetric Players: Equilibrium and Optimal Prize Design
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866912987299708928 |
|---|---|
| author | Fan, Siyuan Kuang, Zhonghong Lu, Jingfeng |
| author_facet | Fan, Siyuan Kuang, Zhonghong Lu, Jingfeng |
| contents | We study $n$-dimensional contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs, where each dimension (battle) is modeled as a Tullock contest. Prize-allocation rules are identity-independent, budget-balanced, and weakly increasing in the number of victories. Players' costs can be separable across battles or exhibit cross-battle externalities. We identify a tight sufficient condition under which a unique equilibrium exists and is in pure strategies, for all admissible prize-allocation rules and all degrees of player asymmetry. Under this condition, we characterize the effort-maximizing prize-allocation rule: the entire prize goes to the player who wins more battles than the opponent by at least a prespecified margin, and is split equally if neither player meets this threshold. In the symmetric-player case, the majority rule is optimal if $n$ is odd. Interestingly, cross-battle cost externalities do not change the optimal prize allocation rule in our setting. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_21564 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Generalized Multidimensional Contests with Asymmetric Players: Equilibrium and Optimal Prize Design Fan, Siyuan Kuang, Zhonghong Lu, Jingfeng Theoretical Economics We study $n$-dimensional contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs, where each dimension (battle) is modeled as a Tullock contest. Prize-allocation rules are identity-independent, budget-balanced, and weakly increasing in the number of victories. Players' costs can be separable across battles or exhibit cross-battle externalities. We identify a tight sufficient condition under which a unique equilibrium exists and is in pure strategies, for all admissible prize-allocation rules and all degrees of player asymmetry. Under this condition, we characterize the effort-maximizing prize-allocation rule: the entire prize goes to the player who wins more battles than the opponent by at least a prespecified margin, and is split equally if neither player meets this threshold. In the symmetric-player case, the majority rule is optimal if $n$ is odd. Interestingly, cross-battle cost externalities do not change the optimal prize allocation rule in our setting. |
| title | Generalized Multidimensional Contests with Asymmetric Players: Equilibrium and Optimal Prize Design |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.21564 |