JSAM: Privacy Straggler-Resilient Joint Client Selection and Incentive Mechanism Design in Differentially Private Federated Learning

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Xu, Ruichen, Zhang, Ying-Jun Angela, Huang, Jianwei
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2026
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author Xu, Ruichen
Zhang, Ying-Jun Angela
Huang, Jianwei
author_facet Xu, Ruichen
Zhang, Ying-Jun Angela
Huang, Jianwei
contents Differentially private federated learning faces a fundamental tension: privacy protection mechanisms that safeguard client data simultaneously create quantifiable privacy costs that discourage participation, undermining the collaborative training process. Existing incentive mechanisms rely on unbiased client selection, forcing servers to compensate even the most privacy-sensitive clients ("privacy stragglers"), leading to systemic inefficiency and suboptimal resource allocation. We introduce JSAM (Joint client Selection and privacy compensAtion Mechanism), a Bayesian-optimal framework that simultaneously optimizes client selection probabilities and privacy compensation to maximize training effectiveness under budget constraints. Our approach transforms a complex 2N-dimensional optimization problem into an efficient three-dimensional formulation through novel theoretical characterization of optimal selection strategies. We prove that servers should preferentially select privacy-tolerant clients while excluding high-sensitivity participants, and uncover the counter-intuitive insight that clients with minimal privacy sensitivity may incur the highest cumulative costs due to frequent participation. Extensive evaluations on MNIST and CIFAR-10 demonstrate that JSAM achieves up to 15% improvement in test accuracy compared to existing unbiased selection mechanisms while maintaining cost efficiency across varying data heterogeneity levels.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_21844
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle JSAM: Privacy Straggler-Resilient Joint Client Selection and Incentive Mechanism Design in Differentially Private Federated Learning
Xu, Ruichen
Zhang, Ying-Jun Angela
Huang, Jianwei
Machine Learning
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Computer Science and Game Theory
Differentially private federated learning faces a fundamental tension: privacy protection mechanisms that safeguard client data simultaneously create quantifiable privacy costs that discourage participation, undermining the collaborative training process. Existing incentive mechanisms rely on unbiased client selection, forcing servers to compensate even the most privacy-sensitive clients ("privacy stragglers"), leading to systemic inefficiency and suboptimal resource allocation. We introduce JSAM (Joint client Selection and privacy compensAtion Mechanism), a Bayesian-optimal framework that simultaneously optimizes client selection probabilities and privacy compensation to maximize training effectiveness under budget constraints. Our approach transforms a complex 2N-dimensional optimization problem into an efficient three-dimensional formulation through novel theoretical characterization of optimal selection strategies. We prove that servers should preferentially select privacy-tolerant clients while excluding high-sensitivity participants, and uncover the counter-intuitive insight that clients with minimal privacy sensitivity may incur the highest cumulative costs due to frequent participation. Extensive evaluations on MNIST and CIFAR-10 demonstrate that JSAM achieves up to 15% improvement in test accuracy compared to existing unbiased selection mechanisms while maintaining cost efficiency across varying data heterogeneity levels.
title JSAM: Privacy Straggler-Resilient Joint Client Selection and Incentive Mechanism Design in Differentially Private Federated Learning
topic Machine Learning
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.21844