Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866915816650309632 |
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| author | Mazorra, Bruno Schlegel, Christoph Mamageishvili, Akaki |
| author_facet | Mazorra, Bruno Schlegel, Christoph Mamageishvili, Akaki |
| contents | There are $n$ players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen wins. The occurrence of the opportunity is observed only with a delay. Taking actions is costly. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game and study worst-case inefficiency of equilibria. Our main motivation is the study of ``probabilistic backrunning" on blockchains, where arbitrageurs want to place an order immediately after a trade that impacts the price on an exchange or after an oracle update. In this context, the number of actions taken can be interpreted as a measure of costly ``spam" generated to compete for the opportunity. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_22032 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam Mazorra, Bruno Schlegel, Christoph Mamageishvili, Akaki Computer Science and Game Theory There are $n$ players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen wins. The occurrence of the opportunity is observed only with a delay. Taking actions is costly. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game and study worst-case inefficiency of equilibria. Our main motivation is the study of ``probabilistic backrunning" on blockchains, where arbitrageurs want to place an order immediately after a trade that impacts the price on an exchange or after an oracle update. In this context, the number of actions taken can be interpreted as a measure of costly ``spam" generated to compete for the opportunity. |
| title | Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.22032 |