Epistemic Filtering and Collective Hallucination: A Jury Theorem for Confidence-Calibrated Agents

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1. Verfasser: Karge, Jonas
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Karge, Jonas
author_facet Karge, Jonas
contents We investigate the collective accuracy of heterogeneous agents who learn to estimate their own reliability over time and selectively abstain from voting. While classical epistemic voting results, such as the \textit{Condorcet Jury Theorem} (CJT), assume fixed participation, real-world aggregation often benefits from allowing agents to say ``I don't know.'' We propose a probabilistic framework where agents engage in a \textit{calibration} phase, updating beliefs about their own fixed competence, before facing a final confidence gate that determines whether to vote or abstain. We derive a non-asymptotic lower bound on the group's success probability and prove that this \textit{selective participation} generalizes the asymptotic guarantees of the CJT to a sequential, confidence-gated setting. Empirically, we validate these bounds via Monte Carlo simulations. While our results are general, we discuss their potential application to AI safety, outlining how this framework can mitigate \textit{hallucinations} in collective LLM decision-making.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_22413
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Epistemic Filtering and Collective Hallucination: A Jury Theorem for Confidence-Calibrated Agents
Karge, Jonas
Artificial Intelligence
We investigate the collective accuracy of heterogeneous agents who learn to estimate their own reliability over time and selectively abstain from voting. While classical epistemic voting results, such as the \textit{Condorcet Jury Theorem} (CJT), assume fixed participation, real-world aggregation often benefits from allowing agents to say ``I don't know.'' We propose a probabilistic framework where agents engage in a \textit{calibration} phase, updating beliefs about their own fixed competence, before facing a final confidence gate that determines whether to vote or abstain. We derive a non-asymptotic lower bound on the group's success probability and prove that this \textit{selective participation} generalizes the asymptotic guarantees of the CJT to a sequential, confidence-gated setting. Empirically, we validate these bounds via Monte Carlo simulations. While our results are general, we discuss their potential application to AI safety, outlining how this framework can mitigate \textit{hallucinations} in collective LLM decision-making.
title Epistemic Filtering and Collective Hallucination: A Jury Theorem for Confidence-Calibrated Agents
topic Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.22413