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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.22915 |
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| _version_ | 1866917295996010496 |
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| author | Farhadi, Farzaneh Chli, Maria |
| author_facet | Farhadi, Farzaneh Chli, Maria |
| contents | We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian game, reflecting conservative, coordination-averse behavior typical in distributed systems. We show that when utilities admit a convex potential and welfare is convex, the robustly implementable optimum has a remarkably simple form: perfect coordination at each state: either everyone acts or no one does. We provide a constructive threshold rule: compute a one-dimensional score for each state, sort states, and pick a single threshold (with a knife-edge lottery for at most one state). This rule is an explicit optimal vertex of a linear program (LP) characterized by feasibility and sequential obedience constraints. Empirically, in both vaccination and technology-adoption domains, our constructive policy matches LP optima, scales as $O(|Θ|\log|Θ|)$, and avoids the inflated welfare predicted by obedience-only designs that assume the designer can dictate the (best) equilibrium. The result is a general, scalable recipe for robust coordination in MAS with complementarities. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_22915 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Robust Information Design for Multi-Agent Systems with Complementarities: Smallest-Equilibrium Threshold Policies Farhadi, Farzaneh Chli, Maria Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian game, reflecting conservative, coordination-averse behavior typical in distributed systems. We show that when utilities admit a convex potential and welfare is convex, the robustly implementable optimum has a remarkably simple form: perfect coordination at each state: either everyone acts or no one does. We provide a constructive threshold rule: compute a one-dimensional score for each state, sort states, and pick a single threshold (with a knife-edge lottery for at most one state). This rule is an explicit optimal vertex of a linear program (LP) characterized by feasibility and sequential obedience constraints. Empirically, in both vaccination and technology-adoption domains, our constructive policy matches LP optima, scales as $O(|Θ|\log|Θ|)$, and avoids the inflated welfare predicted by obedience-only designs that assume the designer can dictate the (best) equilibrium. The result is a general, scalable recipe for robust coordination in MAS with complementarities. |
| title | Robust Information Design for Multi-Agent Systems with Complementarities: Smallest-Equilibrium Threshold Policies |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.22915 |