Purification and Perturbations of Communication and Repeated Games
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arXiv
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866911725814546432 |
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| author | Barton, Alistair |
| author_facet | Barton, Alistair |
| contents | I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated games. In repeated games with public+private monitoring, this means all pure equilibria are perfect public equilibria, and non-trivial belief free equilibria do not exist. In a wide class of communication games (up to allowing receiver commitment), this means persuasion is impossible with state-independent preferences. Nevertheless, these analytic techniques may be made compatible with private preferences through perturbation approaches: considering either payoff-relevance of the private information or correlation between parties' information. An example of the latter occurs by introducing `atonement' to repeated games equilibria. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_23098 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Purification and Perturbations of Communication and Repeated Games Barton, Alistair Theoretical Economics 91A20, 91A27, 91A28, 91A25 I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated games. In repeated games with public+private monitoring, this means all pure equilibria are perfect public equilibria, and non-trivial belief free equilibria do not exist. In a wide class of communication games (up to allowing receiver commitment), this means persuasion is impossible with state-independent preferences. Nevertheless, these analytic techniques may be made compatible with private preferences through perturbation approaches: considering either payoff-relevance of the private information or correlation between parties' information. An example of the latter occurs by introducing `atonement' to repeated games equilibria. |
| title | Purification and Perturbations of Communication and Repeated Games |
| topic | Theoretical Economics 91A20, 91A27, 91A28, 91A25 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.23098 |