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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.23569 |
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| _version_ | 1866911472941006848 |
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| author | Langford, Vincent Zhao, Shihan Zhang, Hongyu Dong, Ben Wang, Qian Rehman, Anees Liu, Yuntao |
| author_facet | Langford, Vincent Zhao, Shihan Zhang, Hongyu Dong, Ben Wang, Qian Rehman, Anees Liu, Yuntao |
| contents | In the realm of quantum computing, quantum circuits serve as essential depictions of quantum algorithms, which are then compiled into executable operations for quantum computations. Quantum compilers are responsible for converting these algorithmic quantum circuits into versions compatible with specific quantum hardware, thus connecting quantum software with hardware. Nevertheless, untrusted quantum compilers present notable threats. They have the potential to result in the theft of quantum circuit designs and jeopardize sensitive intellectual property (IP). In this work, we propose CLOAQ, a quantum circuit obfuscation (QCO) approach that hides the logic and the phase angles of selected gates within the obfuscated quantum circuit. To evaluate the effectiveness of CLOAQ, we sample the input state uniformly from the Hilbert space of all qubits, which is more accurate than prior work that use all-|0> inputs. Our results show that CLOAQ benefits from the synergy between logic and phase protections. Compared with prior QCO approaches using only one perspective, the combined method is more resilient to attacks and causes greater functional disruption when the unlocking key is incorrect. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_23569 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | CLOAQ: Combined Logic and Angle Obfuscation for Quantum Circuits Langford, Vincent Zhao, Shihan Zhang, Hongyu Dong, Ben Wang, Qian Rehman, Anees Liu, Yuntao Cryptography and Security In the realm of quantum computing, quantum circuits serve as essential depictions of quantum algorithms, which are then compiled into executable operations for quantum computations. Quantum compilers are responsible for converting these algorithmic quantum circuits into versions compatible with specific quantum hardware, thus connecting quantum software with hardware. Nevertheless, untrusted quantum compilers present notable threats. They have the potential to result in the theft of quantum circuit designs and jeopardize sensitive intellectual property (IP). In this work, we propose CLOAQ, a quantum circuit obfuscation (QCO) approach that hides the logic and the phase angles of selected gates within the obfuscated quantum circuit. To evaluate the effectiveness of CLOAQ, we sample the input state uniformly from the Hilbert space of all qubits, which is more accurate than prior work that use all-|0> inputs. Our results show that CLOAQ benefits from the synergy between logic and phase protections. Compared with prior QCO approaches using only one perspective, the combined method is more resilient to attacks and causes greater functional disruption when the unlocking key is incorrect. |
| title | CLOAQ: Combined Logic and Angle Obfuscation for Quantum Circuits |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.23569 |