Time Stepped Cyber Physical Simulation of DoS, DoD, and FDI Attacks on the IEEE 14 Bus System
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866915825479319552 |
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| author | Tossa, Manuella Christelle Madrigal, Fernando Blosser, Ryan Akbarfam, Asma Jodeiri |
| author_facet | Tossa, Manuella Christelle Madrigal, Fernando Blosser, Ryan Akbarfam, Asma Jodeiri |
| contents | Reliable grid operation depends on accurate and timely telemetry, making modern power systems vulnerable to communication layer cyberattacks. This paper evaluates how Denial of Service (DoS), Denial of Data (DoD), and False Data Injection (FDI) attacks disrupt the IEEE 14 bus system using a MATLAB only, time stepped simulation framework built on MATPOWER. The framework emulates a 24 hour operating cycle with sinusoidal load variation, introduces attack specific manipulation of load and voltage data, and performs full AC power flow solves with reactive limit enforcement (PV PQ switching). At each timestep, the system logs true and measured voltages, generator P/Q output, system losses, and voltage limit violations to capture transient cyber physical effects. Results show that DoD causes the largest physical distortions and reactive power stress, DoS masks natural variability and degrades situational awareness, and FDI creates significant discrepancies between true and perceived voltages. The study provides a compact, reproducible benchmark for analyzing cyber induced instability and informing future defense strategies. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_00528 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Time Stepped Cyber Physical Simulation of DoS, DoD, and FDI Attacks on the IEEE 14 Bus System Tossa, Manuella Christelle Madrigal, Fernando Blosser, Ryan Akbarfam, Asma Jodeiri Cryptography and Security Systems and Control Reliable grid operation depends on accurate and timely telemetry, making modern power systems vulnerable to communication layer cyberattacks. This paper evaluates how Denial of Service (DoS), Denial of Data (DoD), and False Data Injection (FDI) attacks disrupt the IEEE 14 bus system using a MATLAB only, time stepped simulation framework built on MATPOWER. The framework emulates a 24 hour operating cycle with sinusoidal load variation, introduces attack specific manipulation of load and voltage data, and performs full AC power flow solves with reactive limit enforcement (PV PQ switching). At each timestep, the system logs true and measured voltages, generator P/Q output, system losses, and voltage limit violations to capture transient cyber physical effects. Results show that DoD causes the largest physical distortions and reactive power stress, DoS masks natural variability and degrades situational awareness, and FDI creates significant discrepancies between true and perceived voltages. The study provides a compact, reproducible benchmark for analyzing cyber induced instability and informing future defense strategies. |
| title | Time Stepped Cyber Physical Simulation of DoS, DoD, and FDI Attacks on the IEEE 14 Bus System |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.00528 |