Dial E for Ethical Enforcement: institutional VETO power as a governance primitive
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866914361232064512 |
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| author | Sahoo, Subramanyam Jain, Vinija Chadha, Aman Chaudhary, Divya |
| author_facet | Sahoo, Subramanyam Jain, Vinija Chadha, Aman Chaudhary, Divya |
| contents | The persistent militarization of large reasoning models stems not from technical necessity but from governance arrangements that strip researchers of meaningful authority to refuse harmful transfers and deployments. Existing accountability mechanisms such as model cards and responsible AI statements operate as reputational signals detached from decision making architecture. We identify institutional veto power as a missing governance primitive: a formal authority to halt subsequent use or distribution of research when credible risks of weaponization emerge. Drawing on precedents in nuclear nonproliferation and biomedical ethics, the paper maps unprotected veto points across the research lifecycle, diagnose why compliance without enforceable constraints fails, and offer concrete institutional designs that embed veto authority while reducing the risk of political capture. The paper argues that communities most vulnerable to military uses must lead governance design, and that institutional veto power is a prerequisite for converting symbolic safeguards into enforceable responsibility and for achieving meaningful model disarmament. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_00617 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Dial E for Ethical Enforcement: institutional VETO power as a governance primitive Sahoo, Subramanyam Jain, Vinija Chadha, Aman Chaudhary, Divya Computers and Society The persistent militarization of large reasoning models stems not from technical necessity but from governance arrangements that strip researchers of meaningful authority to refuse harmful transfers and deployments. Existing accountability mechanisms such as model cards and responsible AI statements operate as reputational signals detached from decision making architecture. We identify institutional veto power as a missing governance primitive: a formal authority to halt subsequent use or distribution of research when credible risks of weaponization emerge. Drawing on precedents in nuclear nonproliferation and biomedical ethics, the paper maps unprotected veto points across the research lifecycle, diagnose why compliance without enforceable constraints fails, and offer concrete institutional designs that embed veto authority while reducing the risk of political capture. The paper argues that communities most vulnerable to military uses must lead governance design, and that institutional veto power is a prerequisite for converting symbolic safeguards into enforceable responsibility and for achieving meaningful model disarmament. |
| title | Dial E for Ethical Enforcement: institutional VETO power as a governance primitive |
| topic | Computers and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.00617 |