Turning Black Box into White Box: Dataset Distillation Leaks

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Chen, Huajie, Zhu, Tianqing, Zhong, Yuchen, Zhang, Yang, Wang, Shang, He, Feng, Zhang, Lefeng, Shen, Jialiang, Wang, Minghao, Zhou, Wanlei
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2026
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author Chen, Huajie
Zhu, Tianqing
Zhong, Yuchen
Zhang, Yang
Wang, Shang
He, Feng
Zhang, Lefeng
Shen, Jialiang
Wang, Minghao
Zhou, Wanlei
author_facet Chen, Huajie
Zhu, Tianqing
Zhong, Yuchen
Zhang, Yang
Wang, Shang
He, Feng
Zhang, Lefeng
Shen, Jialiang
Wang, Minghao
Zhou, Wanlei
contents Dataset distillation compresses a large real dataset into a small synthetic one, enabling models trained on the synthetic data to achieve performance comparable to those trained on the real data. Although synthetic datasets are assumed to be privacy-preserving, we show that existing distillation methods can cause severe privacy leakage because synthetic datasets implicitly encode the weight trajectories of the distilled model, they become over-informative and exploitable by adversaries. To expose this risk, we introduce the Information Revelation Attack (IRA) against state-of-the-art distillation techniques. Experiments show that IRA accurately predicts both the distillation algorithm and model architecture, and can successfully infer membership and recover sensitive samples from the real dataset.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_01053
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Turning Black Box into White Box: Dataset Distillation Leaks
Chen, Huajie
Zhu, Tianqing
Zhong, Yuchen
Zhang, Yang
Wang, Shang
He, Feng
Zhang, Lefeng
Shen, Jialiang
Wang, Minghao
Zhou, Wanlei
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Machine Learning
Dataset distillation compresses a large real dataset into a small synthetic one, enabling models trained on the synthetic data to achieve performance comparable to those trained on the real data. Although synthetic datasets are assumed to be privacy-preserving, we show that existing distillation methods can cause severe privacy leakage because synthetic datasets implicitly encode the weight trajectories of the distilled model, they become over-informative and exploitable by adversaries. To expose this risk, we introduce the Information Revelation Attack (IRA) against state-of-the-art distillation techniques. Experiments show that IRA accurately predicts both the distillation algorithm and model architecture, and can successfully infer membership and recover sensitive samples from the real dataset.
title Turning Black Box into White Box: Dataset Distillation Leaks
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.01053