On the Practical Feasibility of Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later Attacks
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866915825835835392 |
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| author | Blanco-Romero, Javier Mendoza, Florina Almenares Rubio, Carlos García Campo, Celeste Sánchez, Daniel Díaz |
| author_facet | Blanco-Romero, Javier Mendoza, Florina Almenares Rubio, Carlos García Campo, Celeste Sánchez, Daniel Díaz |
| contents | Harvest-now, decrypt-later (HN-DL) attacks threaten today's encrypted communications by archiving ciphertext until a quantum computer can break the underlying key exchange. This paper reframes HN-DL as an economic problem, quantifying adversary costs across Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2, TLS 1.3, QUIC, and Secure Shell (SSH) with an open-source testbed that reproduces the full attack sequence. Our model shows that retaining intercepted traffic is economically trivial, shifting the defensive question from whether an adversary can archive to how much decryption will cost. We evaluate protocol configuration strategies that act along two independent cost axes: storage overhead and quantum workload. Beyond the ongoing migration to post-quantum cryptography, these strategies provide defense in depth with current infrastructure. Encrypted Client Hello forces indiscriminate bulk collection, inflating the archive the adversary must retain, while aggressive rekeying and larger key exchange parameters multiply the quantum computations required to recover plaintext. Because storage inflation penalizes both sides while quantum cost inflation targets the adversary alone, rekeying and key size selection offer the strongest defensive levers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_01091 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On the Practical Feasibility of Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later Attacks Blanco-Romero, Javier Mendoza, Florina Almenares Rubio, Carlos García Campo, Celeste Sánchez, Daniel Díaz Cryptography and Security Harvest-now, decrypt-later (HN-DL) attacks threaten today's encrypted communications by archiving ciphertext until a quantum computer can break the underlying key exchange. This paper reframes HN-DL as an economic problem, quantifying adversary costs across Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2, TLS 1.3, QUIC, and Secure Shell (SSH) with an open-source testbed that reproduces the full attack sequence. Our model shows that retaining intercepted traffic is economically trivial, shifting the defensive question from whether an adversary can archive to how much decryption will cost. We evaluate protocol configuration strategies that act along two independent cost axes: storage overhead and quantum workload. Beyond the ongoing migration to post-quantum cryptography, these strategies provide defense in depth with current infrastructure. Encrypted Client Hello forces indiscriminate bulk collection, inflating the archive the adversary must retain, while aggressive rekeying and larger key exchange parameters multiply the quantum computations required to recover plaintext. Because storage inflation penalizes both sides while quantum cost inflation targets the adversary alone, rekeying and key size selection offer the strongest defensive levers. |
| title | On the Practical Feasibility of Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later Attacks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.01091 |