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Path Dependence under Adaptive AI Delegation

Fuente: arXiv

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali:	Huang, Lingxiao, Vishnoi, Nisheeth K.
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2026
Soggetti:	Computers and Society Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory
Accesso online:	Acceder al recurso
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