Delegation and Verification Under AI
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866915831339810816 |
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| author | Huang, Lingxiao Xiao, Wenyang Vishnoi, Nisheeth K. |
| author_facet | Huang, Lingxiao Xiao, Wenyang Vishnoi, Nisheeth K. |
| contents | As AI systems enter institutional workflows, workers must decide whether to delegate task execution to AI and how much effort to invest in verifying AI outputs, while institutions evaluate workers using outcome-based standards that may misalign with workers' private costs. We model delegation and verification as the solution to a rational worker's optimization problem, and define worker quality by evaluating an institution-centered utility (distinct from the worker's objective) at the resulting optimal action. We formally characterize optimal worker workflows and show that AI induces *phase transitions*, where arbitrarily small differences in verification ability lead to sharply different behaviors. As a result, AI can amplify workers with strong verification reliability while degrading institutional worker quality for others who rationally over-delegate and reduce oversight, even when baseline task success improves and no behavioral biases are present. These results identify a structural mechanism by which AI reshapes institutional worker quality and amplifies quality disparities between workers with different verification reliability. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_02961 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Delegation and Verification Under AI Huang, Lingxiao Xiao, Wenyang Vishnoi, Nisheeth K. Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Computers and Society Theoretical Economics As AI systems enter institutional workflows, workers must decide whether to delegate task execution to AI and how much effort to invest in verifying AI outputs, while institutions evaluate workers using outcome-based standards that may misalign with workers' private costs. We model delegation and verification as the solution to a rational worker's optimization problem, and define worker quality by evaluating an institution-centered utility (distinct from the worker's objective) at the resulting optimal action. We formally characterize optimal worker workflows and show that AI induces *phase transitions*, where arbitrarily small differences in verification ability lead to sharply different behaviors. As a result, AI can amplify workers with strong verification reliability while degrading institutional worker quality for others who rationally over-delegate and reduce oversight, even when baseline task success improves and no behavioral biases are present. These results identify a structural mechanism by which AI reshapes institutional worker quality and amplifies quality disparities between workers with different verification reliability. |
| title | Delegation and Verification Under AI |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Computers and Society Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.02961 |