SPOILER: TEE-Shielded DNN Partitioning of On-Device Secure Inference with Poison Learning

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Kang, Donghwa, Choe, Hojun, Kim, Doohyun, Baek, Hyeongboo, Kang, Brent ByungHoon
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2026
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author Kang, Donghwa
Choe, Hojun
Kim, Doohyun
Baek, Hyeongboo
Kang, Brent ByungHoon
author_facet Kang, Donghwa
Choe, Hojun
Kim, Doohyun
Baek, Hyeongboo
Kang, Brent ByungHoon
contents Deploying deep neural networks (DNNs) on edge devices exposes valuable intellectual property to model-stealing attacks. While TEE-shielded DNN partitioning (TSDP) mitigates this by isolating sensitive computations, existing paradigms fail to simultaneously satisfy privacy and efficiency. The training-before-partition paradigm suffers from intrinsic privacy leakage, whereas the partition-before-training paradigm incurs severe latency due to structural dependencies that hinder parallel execution. To overcome these limitations, we propose SPOILER, a novel search-before-training framework that fundamentally decouples the TEE sub-network from the backbone via hardware-aware neural architecture search (NAS). SPOILER identifies a lightweight TEE architecture strictly optimized for hardware constraints, maximizing parallel efficiency. Furthermore, we introduce self-poisoning learning to enforce logical isolation, rendering the exposed backbone functionally incoherent without the TEE component. Extensive experiments on CNNs and Transformers demonstrate that SPOILER achieves state-of-the-art trade-offs between security, latency, and accuracy.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_06263
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle SPOILER: TEE-Shielded DNN Partitioning of On-Device Secure Inference with Poison Learning
Kang, Donghwa
Choe, Hojun
Kim, Doohyun
Baek, Hyeongboo
Kang, Brent ByungHoon
Cryptography and Security
Deploying deep neural networks (DNNs) on edge devices exposes valuable intellectual property to model-stealing attacks. While TEE-shielded DNN partitioning (TSDP) mitigates this by isolating sensitive computations, existing paradigms fail to simultaneously satisfy privacy and efficiency. The training-before-partition paradigm suffers from intrinsic privacy leakage, whereas the partition-before-training paradigm incurs severe latency due to structural dependencies that hinder parallel execution. To overcome these limitations, we propose SPOILER, a novel search-before-training framework that fundamentally decouples the TEE sub-network from the backbone via hardware-aware neural architecture search (NAS). SPOILER identifies a lightweight TEE architecture strictly optimized for hardware constraints, maximizing parallel efficiency. Furthermore, we introduce self-poisoning learning to enforce logical isolation, rendering the exposed backbone functionally incoherent without the TEE component. Extensive experiments on CNNs and Transformers demonstrate that SPOILER achieves state-of-the-art trade-offs between security, latency, and accuracy.
title SPOILER: TEE-Shielded DNN Partitioning of On-Device Secure Inference with Poison Learning
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.06263