Coordination Games on Multiplex Networks: Consensus, Convergence, and Stability of Opinion Dynamics
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866914581159346176 |
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| author | Shiu, Ruey-An Naghizadeh, Parinaz |
| author_facet | Shiu, Ruey-An Naghizadeh, Parinaz |
| contents | This paper studies opinion dynamics in multilayer (social) networks. Extending a single-layer model, we formulate opinion updates as a synchronous coordination game in which agents minimize a local cost to stay close to their neighbors' opinions. We propose two coupling mechanisms between layers: (i) a merged model that aggregates layers through weighted influences, and (ii) a switching model that periodically alternates across layers. Using random-walk and spectral analysis, we derive sufficient conditions for consensus, characterize convergence rates, and analyze stability under network perturbations. We show that multilayer interactions can induce or accelerate global consensus even when no single layer achieves it alone, and conversely, that individually coordinated layers may lose consensus once interconnected. Notably, we show that similarity between the layers (as captured by alignments in the weighted degrees of the nodes) is a main determinant of if merging or switching can speed up convergence to consensus compared to when the layers operate in isolation, providing guidelines for network design interventions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_07633 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Coordination Games on Multiplex Networks: Consensus, Convergence, and Stability of Opinion Dynamics Shiu, Ruey-An Naghizadeh, Parinaz Computer Science and Game Theory This paper studies opinion dynamics in multilayer (social) networks. Extending a single-layer model, we formulate opinion updates as a synchronous coordination game in which agents minimize a local cost to stay close to their neighbors' opinions. We propose two coupling mechanisms between layers: (i) a merged model that aggregates layers through weighted influences, and (ii) a switching model that periodically alternates across layers. Using random-walk and spectral analysis, we derive sufficient conditions for consensus, characterize convergence rates, and analyze stability under network perturbations. We show that multilayer interactions can induce or accelerate global consensus even when no single layer achieves it alone, and conversely, that individually coordinated layers may lose consensus once interconnected. Notably, we show that similarity between the layers (as captured by alignments in the weighted degrees of the nodes) is a main determinant of if merging or switching can speed up convergence to consensus compared to when the layers operate in isolation, providing guidelines for network design interventions. |
| title | Coordination Games on Multiplex Networks: Consensus, Convergence, and Stability of Opinion Dynamics |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.07633 |