Unintended Consequences: Updating Causal Models

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Halpern, Joseph Y., Piermont, Evan, Vierø, Marie-Louise
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2026
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author Halpern, Joseph Y.
Piermont, Evan
Vierø, Marie-Louise
author_facet Halpern, Joseph Y.
Piermont, Evan
Vierø, Marie-Louise
contents We examine how causal beliefs affect an agent's choices and how feedback on those choices leads to updated causal beliefs. Building on the structural-equations framework for modeling causality, we first examine the general problem of updating causal beliefs in the face of novel (and possibly inexplicable) data. We model an agent who is uncertain of the true causal model, and therefore entertains a probabilistic belief over the set of possible models. We then consider how causal beliefs influence choices by building a model of agency and utility on top of the usual structural-equations framework. Using these two components, we propose a notion of steady state, where the feedback received from an agent's optimal action, given her current beliefs about the true causal model, can be rationalized by those beliefs.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_09387
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Unintended Consequences: Updating Causal Models
Halpern, Joseph Y.
Piermont, Evan
Vierø, Marie-Louise
Theoretical Economics
We examine how causal beliefs affect an agent's choices and how feedback on those choices leads to updated causal beliefs. Building on the structural-equations framework for modeling causality, we first examine the general problem of updating causal beliefs in the face of novel (and possibly inexplicable) data. We model an agent who is uncertain of the true causal model, and therefore entertains a probabilistic belief over the set of possible models. We then consider how causal beliefs influence choices by building a model of agency and utility on top of the usual structural-equations framework. Using these two components, we propose a notion of steady state, where the feedback received from an agent's optimal action, given her current beliefs about the true causal model, can be rationalized by those beliefs.
title Unintended Consequences: Updating Causal Models
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.09387