Sampling Logit Equilibrium and Endogenous Payoff Distortion
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866914381463289856 |
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| author | Osawa, Minoru |
| author_facet | Osawa, Minoru |
| contents | We introduce the sampling logit equilibrium (SLE), a stationary concept for population games in which agents evaluate actions using a finite sample of opponents' plays and respond according to a logit choice rule. This framework combines informational frictions from finite sampling with stochastic choice. When the sample size is large, SLE is well approximated by a logit equilibrium of a virtual game whose payoffs incorporate explicit distortion terms generated by sampling noise. Examples illustrate how finite sampling can systematically shift equilibrium behavior and generate equilibrium selection effects. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_09539 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Sampling Logit Equilibrium and Endogenous Payoff Distortion Osawa, Minoru Theoretical Economics Dynamical Systems We introduce the sampling logit equilibrium (SLE), a stationary concept for population games in which agents evaluate actions using a finite sample of opponents' plays and respond according to a logit choice rule. This framework combines informational frictions from finite sampling with stochastic choice. When the sample size is large, SLE is well approximated by a logit equilibrium of a virtual game whose payoffs incorporate explicit distortion terms generated by sampling noise. Examples illustrate how finite sampling can systematically shift equilibrium behavior and generate equilibrium selection effects. |
| title | Sampling Logit Equilibrium and Endogenous Payoff Distortion |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Dynamical Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.09539 |