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| Natura: | Preprint |
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2026
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| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.09569 |
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| _version_ | 1866908876995035136 |
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| author | Kubyshkina, Ekaterina Petrolo, Mattia |
| author_facet | Kubyshkina, Ekaterina Petrolo, Mattia |
| contents | In this work, we argue that ignorance can be inherently understood as a hyperintensional notion. When faced with two logically or necessarily equivalent propositions, an agent may be ignorant of one while not of the other. To capture formally this intuition, we employ a topic-sensitive semantics, enabling the modeling of an agent's attitude toward the content of a proposition. Within this framework, we reevaluate three existing logical systems, usually characterized by standard Kripke semantics, to account for three forms of ignorance: ignorance whether, ignorance as unknown truth, and disbelieving ignorance. For each form, we present a sound and complete system. To highlight the advantage of this approach, we apply it to address the problem of logical omniscience rephrased in terms of ignorance. The resulting framework considers an agent's capacity to grasp the content of a proposition, bridging the gap between standard relational settings for ignorance representation and natural intuitions about the role of content in forming one's ignorance. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_09569 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Ignorance with(out) Grasping Kubyshkina, Ekaterina Petrolo, Mattia Logic In this work, we argue that ignorance can be inherently understood as a hyperintensional notion. When faced with two logically or necessarily equivalent propositions, an agent may be ignorant of one while not of the other. To capture formally this intuition, we employ a topic-sensitive semantics, enabling the modeling of an agent's attitude toward the content of a proposition. Within this framework, we reevaluate three existing logical systems, usually characterized by standard Kripke semantics, to account for three forms of ignorance: ignorance whether, ignorance as unknown truth, and disbelieving ignorance. For each form, we present a sound and complete system. To highlight the advantage of this approach, we apply it to address the problem of logical omniscience rephrased in terms of ignorance. The resulting framework considers an agent's capacity to grasp the content of a proposition, bridging the gap between standard relational settings for ignorance representation and natural intuitions about the role of content in forming one's ignorance. |
| title | Ignorance with(out) Grasping |
| topic | Logic |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.09569 |