Competition between DEXs through Dynamic Fees
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866912959156977664 |
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| author | Baggiani, Leonardo Herdegen, Martin Sanchez-Betancourt, Leandro |
| author_facet | Baggiani, Leonardo Herdegen, Martin Sanchez-Betancourt, Leandro |
| contents | We find an approximate Nash equilibrium in a game between decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that compete for order flow by setting dynamic trading fees. We characterize the equilibrium via a coupled system of partial differential equations and derive tractable approximate closed-form expressions for the equilibrium fees. Our analysis shows that the two-regime structure found in monopoly models persists under competition: pools alternate between raising fees to deter arbitrage and lowering fees to attract noise trading and increase volatility. Under competition, however, the switching boundary shifts from the oracle price to a weighted average of the oracle and competitors' exchange rates. Our numerical experiments show that, holding total liquidity fixed, an increase in the number of competing DEXs reduces execution slippage for strategic liquidity takers and lowers fee revenue per DEX. Finally, the effect on noise traders' slippage depends on market activity: they are worse off in low-activity markets but better off in high-activity ones. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_09669 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Competition between DEXs through Dynamic Fees Baggiani, Leonardo Herdegen, Martin Sanchez-Betancourt, Leandro Mathematical Finance Optimization and Control Trading and Market Microstructure We find an approximate Nash equilibrium in a game between decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that compete for order flow by setting dynamic trading fees. We characterize the equilibrium via a coupled system of partial differential equations and derive tractable approximate closed-form expressions for the equilibrium fees. Our analysis shows that the two-regime structure found in monopoly models persists under competition: pools alternate between raising fees to deter arbitrage and lowering fees to attract noise trading and increase volatility. Under competition, however, the switching boundary shifts from the oracle price to a weighted average of the oracle and competitors' exchange rates. Our numerical experiments show that, holding total liquidity fixed, an increase in the number of competing DEXs reduces execution slippage for strategic liquidity takers and lowers fee revenue per DEX. Finally, the effect on noise traders' slippage depends on market activity: they are worse off in low-activity markets but better off in high-activity ones. |
| title | Competition between DEXs through Dynamic Fees |
| topic | Mathematical Finance Optimization and Control Trading and Market Microstructure |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.09669 |