The coordination gap in frontier AI safety policies
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866913149025779712 |
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| author | Mengesha, Isaak |
| author_facet | Mengesha, Isaak |
| contents | Frontier AI Safety Policies concentrate on prevention: capability evaluations, deployment gates, and usage constraints, while neglecting the capacity to coordinate responses when prevention fails. We argue this coordination gap is structural: investments in ecosystem robustness yield diffuse benefits but concentrated costs, generating systematic underinvestment. Drawing on risk regimes in nuclear safety, pandemic preparedness, and critical infrastructure, we propose that similar mechanisms (precommitment, shared protocols, standing coordination venues) could be adapted to frontier AI governance. Closing the gap requires cross-actor "note-exchange" of ex ante if-then response logic, exposing not only triggers but the decision processes that convert signals into actions. Without such architecture, institutions cannot learn from failures at the pace of relevance. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_10015 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The coordination gap in frontier AI safety policies Mengesha, Isaak Computers and Society General Economics Economics Frontier AI Safety Policies concentrate on prevention: capability evaluations, deployment gates, and usage constraints, while neglecting the capacity to coordinate responses when prevention fails. We argue this coordination gap is structural: investments in ecosystem robustness yield diffuse benefits but concentrated costs, generating systematic underinvestment. Drawing on risk regimes in nuclear safety, pandemic preparedness, and critical infrastructure, we propose that similar mechanisms (precommitment, shared protocols, standing coordination venues) could be adapted to frontier AI governance. Closing the gap requires cross-actor "note-exchange" of ex ante if-then response logic, exposing not only triggers but the decision processes that convert signals into actions. Without such architecture, institutions cannot learn from failures at the pace of relevance. |
| title | The coordination gap in frontier AI safety policies |
| topic | Computers and Society General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.10015 |