MirrorDrift: Actuated Mirror-Based Attacks on LiDAR SLAM

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Nagata, Rokuto, Koide, Kenji, Ikeda, Kazuma, Sako, Ozora, Horie, Shion, Yoshioka, Kentaro
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Nagata, Rokuto
Koide, Kenji
Ikeda, Kazuma
Sako, Ozora
Horie, Shion
Yoshioka, Kentaro
author_facet Nagata, Rokuto
Koide, Kenji
Ikeda, Kazuma
Sako, Ozora
Horie, Shion
Yoshioka, Kentaro
contents LiDAR SLAM provides high-accuracy localization but is fragile to point-cloud corruption because scan matching assumes geometric consistency. Prior physical attacks on LiDAR SLAM largely rely on LiDAR spoofing via external signal injection, which requires sensor-specific timing knowledge and is increasingly mitigated by modern defense mechanisms such as timing obfuscation and injection rejection. In this work, we show that specular reflection offers an injection-free alternative and demonstrate an attack, MirrorDrift, that uses an actuated planar mirror to cause ghost points in LiDAR scans and systematically bias scan-matching correspondences. MirrorDrift optimizes mirror placement, alignment, and actuation. In simulation, it increases the average pose error (APE) by 6.1x over random placement, degrading three SLAM systems to 2.29-3.31 m mean APE. In real-world experiments on a modern LiDAR with state-of-the-art interference mitigation, it induces localization errors of up to 6.03 m. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful SLAM-targeted attack against production-grade secure LiDARs.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_11364
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle MirrorDrift: Actuated Mirror-Based Attacks on LiDAR SLAM
Nagata, Rokuto
Koide, Kenji
Ikeda, Kazuma
Sako, Ozora
Horie, Shion
Yoshioka, Kentaro
Robotics
LiDAR SLAM provides high-accuracy localization but is fragile to point-cloud corruption because scan matching assumes geometric consistency. Prior physical attacks on LiDAR SLAM largely rely on LiDAR spoofing via external signal injection, which requires sensor-specific timing knowledge and is increasingly mitigated by modern defense mechanisms such as timing obfuscation and injection rejection. In this work, we show that specular reflection offers an injection-free alternative and demonstrate an attack, MirrorDrift, that uses an actuated planar mirror to cause ghost points in LiDAR scans and systematically bias scan-matching correspondences. MirrorDrift optimizes mirror placement, alignment, and actuation. In simulation, it increases the average pose error (APE) by 6.1x over random placement, degrading three SLAM systems to 2.29-3.31 m mean APE. In real-world experiments on a modern LiDAR with state-of-the-art interference mitigation, it induces localization errors of up to 6.03 m. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful SLAM-targeted attack against production-grade secure LiDARs.
title MirrorDrift: Actuated Mirror-Based Attacks on LiDAR SLAM
topic Robotics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.11364