Persistence, patience and costly information acquisition
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866918470483968000 |
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| author | Davies, Benjamin |
| author_facet | Davies, Benjamin |
| contents | A forward-looking agent observes signals of a state that follows a Gaussian AR(1) process. He balances the cost of having imprecise beliefs with the cost of acquiring more precise signals. I characterize his optimal information acquisition policy, and analyze how his steady-state beliefs and costs depend on persistence (the AR(1) parameter) and patience (the agent's discount factor). Higher persistence has a non-monotone effect on belief precision and raises overall costs. Higher patience makes beliefs more precise and lowers overall costs. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_11453 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Persistence, patience and costly information acquisition Davies, Benjamin Theoretical Economics A forward-looking agent observes signals of a state that follows a Gaussian AR(1) process. He balances the cost of having imprecise beliefs with the cost of acquiring more precise signals. I characterize his optimal information acquisition policy, and analyze how his steady-state beliefs and costs depend on persistence (the AR(1) parameter) and patience (the agent's discount factor). Higher persistence has a non-monotone effect on belief precision and raises overall costs. Higher patience makes beliefs more precise and lowers overall costs. |
| title | Persistence, patience and costly information acquisition |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.11453 |