Self-Confirming Mechanisms
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866911511741464576 |
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| author | Feng, Zhiming Liu, Qingmin |
| author_facet | Feng, Zhiming Liu, Qingmin |
| contents | This paper studies mechanism design environments in which the designer does not know the distribution of agents' private information a priori and instead learns from agents' behavior induced by the mechanism itself. We formalize a notion of self-confirming mechanisms and a refinement thereof, capturing the idea that an equilibrium mechanism is optimal given the designer's belief and that this belief is consistent with the information produced by the mechanism. We establish a fictitious revelation principle, showing that any incentive-compatible mechanism can be represented as a direct mechanism with filtered type reports that preserve the original mechanism's informational content. Applying the framework to a monopoly problem, we show that, subject to an equilibrium refinement, dominant-strategy self-confirming mechanisms are exactly posted-price mechanisms with locally revenue-maximizing prices. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2603_12532 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Self-Confirming Mechanisms Feng, Zhiming Liu, Qingmin Theoretical Economics This paper studies mechanism design environments in which the designer does not know the distribution of agents' private information a priori and instead learns from agents' behavior induced by the mechanism itself. We formalize a notion of self-confirming mechanisms and a refinement thereof, capturing the idea that an equilibrium mechanism is optimal given the designer's belief and that this belief is consistent with the information produced by the mechanism. We establish a fictitious revelation principle, showing that any incentive-compatible mechanism can be represented as a direct mechanism with filtered type reports that preserve the original mechanism's informational content. Applying the framework to a monopoly problem, we show that, subject to an equilibrium refinement, dominant-strategy self-confirming mechanisms are exactly posted-price mechanisms with locally revenue-maximizing prices. |
| title | Self-Confirming Mechanisms |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.12532 |