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Self-Confirming Mechanisms

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Feng, Zhiming, Liu, Qingmin
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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